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RECENT DECISIONS.

realistic approach of the Supreme Court, courts will avoid the
wholesale destruction of charitable trusts while removing discrimination from areas hitherto beyond the reach of the Constitution.

x
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - REmovAL OF FEERA.L JUDGES RELIEF DENIEn FROm INTERLOCUTORY ORDER OF JUDICIAL
COUNCIL. - A meeting of the Judicial Council of the Tenth Circuit
of the United States reviewed the actions of Chief Judge Stephen
Chandler concerning the affairs of the United States District Court
for the Western District of Oklahoma. An order was issued,
purportedly under authority of a federal statute,' stating that Judge
Chandler, being presently unable, or unwilling, to discharge efficiently
the duties of his office, was to take no action whatever in any case
or proceeding then or thereafter pending before his court. Judge
Chandler applied to Mr. Justice White, Circuit judge for the Tenth
Circuit, to stay the order of the Judicial Council. The application
was referred to the Supreme Court which held that since the action
was entirely interlocutory in character, the relief requested should
be denied pending further proceedings. Chandler v. Judicial Council
of the Tenth Circuit of the United States, 382 U.S. 1003 (1966).
During the middle ages, royal officials of England held their
offices either "during good behavior" or "during the King's pleasure. ' 2 In addition, English judges could be disenfranchised by
impeachment proceedings in the legislature or by writ of scire facias
in the courts. 3 However, the English Act of Settlement,' enacted
subsequent to the Puritan Revolution, was interpreted as providing
that English judges held their offices "during good behavior," 5 and
that they could be removed only for misconduct upon address by
Since it appears that the writ of
both Houses of Parliament.
scire facias had not been employed for some time, there was no

U.S.C. §332 (1964).
128
2
Ross, "Good Behavior" of Federal Judges, 12 U. Kw. CITy L.

REV.

119, 120O (1944).

3Id. at 120-22. Late in the 16th century, the word "impeachment!' began
to acquire its present meaning of accusing a person of a high crime or mis-

demeanor. Yankwich, Impeachment of Civil Officers Under the Federal
Constitution, 26 GEo. L.J. 849 (1938). On the other hand, scire facias was a
writ requesting that authority given be repealed. BLACE, LAW DICTIONARY
(4th ed. 1951).

4Act of Settlement, 1700, 12 & 13 Will. 3, c. 2.
GRoss, supra note 2, at 119-21.
aAct of Settlement, 1700, 12 & 13 Will. 3, c. 2; see BoRxIN, TiE CoR-

RUPT JUDGE 193 (1962).
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indication as to whether the Act of Settlement was intended as
the'exclusive remedy for the removal of judicial officers.7
Finding no real solution to the problem in English precedent,
the framers of the Constitution were forced to resolve the problem
unaided. As finally adopted, the Constitution provided that the
"House of Representatives . . ; shall have the sole Power of
Impeachment" 8 and the "Senate shall have the sole Power to try
all Impeachments." 9 It further provided that "all civil Officers of
the United States, shall be removed from Office on Impeachment
for, and Conviction of, Treason, Bribery, or other high Crimes and
Misdemeanors,"1 and that "Judges, both of the supreme and inferior
Courts, shall hold their Offices during good Behaviour."'"
The main purpose of the framers of the Constitution was to
supply a legislative balance on the other departments of Government.
Without such an express provision, removal of judicial officers by
the legislature would have been impliedly prohibited by the separation of powers doctrine. 12 While the President is empovered to
remove execiutive officers,' 3 he has no such power with regard to
officers who exercise, a judicial or quasi-judicial function. 4 In
addition, the judicial branch has been -granted no express power
whereby it may police its own members. Since the Government of
the Ufiited'States can claim no powers other than those expressly
granted or necessarily implied by the Constitution, 15 it would seem,
then that congressional impeachment is the' only lawful method for
the 'removal of judges.'
The power of impeachment has been used sparingly against
federal judges. In fact, impeachment proceedings have been brought
against only eight judges, four of whom were convicted and removed
from office.' 7 During the impeachment trial of Justice Samuel
Chase in 1805, the Senate established a precedent whereby judges
7 Ross, supra note 2, at 120-22.
8 U.S. CoxisT. art. I, § 2. (Emphasis added.)
9 U.S. Coi'sT. art. I, § 3. (Emphasis added.)
10 U.S. Coi sT. art. II, § 4.
"U.S. CONST. art. IlI, § 1.
12 Shartel, Federal udges-Appointment, Supervisio, and Removal-Soine

Possibilities Under the Constitution, 28 MicE. L. REv. 870, 893 (1930). "The
separation of powers doctrine stands in the way of any legislative removal of
executive and judicial officers, except as such removal is expressly authorized
in the one form-impeachment." Id. at 881.

'3Meyers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 164 (1926).
'4 Wiener v. United States, 357 U.S. 349 (1958).
's Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat) 304, 326 (1816).
18 Yankwich, supra note 3, at 867.
17 BORKiN, TiE CoRuupr JUDGE 198-200 (1962). While impeachment

pro-

ceedings were initiated against two other judges, they were never culminated.
In one case the proceedings were abandoned; in the other, the judge resigned.
Reinhardt, The Impeachment ProceedingsAgainst Judge James Hawkins Peck,

12 U.

KA

. CiTy L. REv. 106, 108 (1944).

1966 ]

RECENT DECISIONS

were not to be removed from their offices because of the content
of their decisions or because of unusual or offensive mannerisms.
Thereafter, removal would be proper solely in instances involving
serious misconduct."" Later, in convicting judge Robert Archbald,
the Senate approved the doctrine that the constitutional provision
limiting judges' tenure to "good behavior" is attended with the
corollary that they may be removed for behavior which is "not
good."'19 In 1936, the last impeachment of a federal judge took
place when the Senate convicted Judge Halsted Ritter. 0 In its
ruling, the Senate stated that while the accused was not guilty of
the violations charged, it would still order his removal since his
21
conduct in the matters charged had brought his office into disrepute.
In the instant case, the Judicial Council, relying upon a statute,
ordered that Chief Judge Chandler take no further action in any
case or proceeding pending before his court, and that all such cases
22
and proceedings be reassigned to the other judges of the court.
The statute referred to by the Council empowers that body to
"make all necessary orders for the effective and expeditious administration of the business of the courts .... ,,23 Upon referral, the
Supreme Court, finding the order interlocutory in character, denied
Judge Chandler's application for a stay pending further proceedings
by the Judicial Council. In a vigorous dissent, Justice Black,
joined by Justice Douglas, stated that "the Council is completely
without legal authority to issue any such order, either temporary
or permanent, with or without a hearing, that no statute purports
to authorize it, and that the Constitution forbids it."'24

As to the statute creating the Judicial Council, the minority
justices could find no language whatever which could reasonably
be interpreted as giving the Council the authority to divest district
judges of their power to try cases. The purpose of the statute,
said the Justices, was to vest the Judicial Council with administrative powers only.
Since the order of the Council was interlocutory, the Supreme
Court's refusal to rule on the merits of the case was in accord with
prior decisions. 25 As the dissenting Justices point out, the Court's
isBlackmar, On the Removal of Judges: The Impeachment Trial of
Samuel Chase, 48 3. Am. Jtm. Soc'y 183, 184 (1965).
'1 ten Broek, Partisan Politics and Federal Judgeship Impeachment Since
1903, 23 MINN. L. REv. 185, 193 (1939).
20 BoH

,

THE CoRRuPr

JuDGE

199-200 (1962).

Yankivich, supra note 3, at 858.
22 See Chandler v. Judicial Council of the Tenth Circuit of the United
States, 382 U.S. 1003, 1004 (1966) (dissenting opinion).
23 28 U.S.C. § 332 (1964).
24 Chandler v. Judicial Council of the Tenth Circuit of the United States,
supra note 22.
25 See, e.g., Market St Ry. v. Railroad Comm'n, 324 U.S. 548 (1945);
Clark v. Williad, 292 U.S. 112 (1934).
21
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refusal to stay the order has prevented Judge Chandler from exercising the powers of his office pending further proceedings by the
Council. The question presented in this proceeding was one that
26
has been the subject of a great deal of controversy in the past.

Indeed, the problem of judicial removal of members of the judiciary
will be left to public debate until conditions exist whereby the
United States Supreme Court will be forced to finally resolve the
issue.
The action of the Judicial Council in promulgating its order
appears to extend beyond the authority of the statute upon which
the order was based. It seems that the Council extended the
statute's application well beyond its intended legislative purpose,
for the act speaks of nothing but the use of administrative powers
in controlling the business before the courts. Indeed, the work
of the Councils in the past had been concerned with only such
2
matters as the civil and criminal rules and sentencing procedures. T
It does not appear that the Council has been authorized by the
statute to assume powers expressly and solely granted to the Senate,
and to proceed to remove judges from the bench.
Apparently the Council sought to circumvent this objection
by prohibiting Judge Chandler only from hearing or deciding cases
presently before him. Then, assuming that the district judges could
not agree among themselves as to the assignment of cases and the
division of business in the district, the Council would be empowered
to assign cases to the judges.28 By such a stratagem, the judge is
virtually impeached, retaining only his title and right to salary.
It has long been contended that the impeachment process
provided by the Constitution as applied to the judiciary is obsolete,
and that such a process cannot be depended upon to provide a
practical remedy in the ordinary case. Rather, the present process
may be best characterized as a warning of the
2 9 extreme sanction
which may be applied in the extraordinary case.
When the Constitution was adopted, the framers apparently felt
that Congress would be capable of discharging the power of impeachment, and that by limiting removal of judges to the cumbersome
26 Compare Otis, A Proposed Tribunal: Is it Constitutional?, 7 U. KAx.
CiTy L. REv. 3 (1938), with McAdoo, Alternative Method to Impeachment
for Trial of Inferior Federal Judges, Case & Com., Summer 1936, p. 9.
27 ABA, THE IMPROVEMENT OF THE ADAINISTRATOT OF JuSTiCE 24 (4th
ed. 1961). In August, 1965, the American Bar Association's Committee on
Judicial Selection, Tenure and Compensation recommended that the problem
of the aged, ill or otherwise infirm judge not capable of carrying out his
duties be studied. One member of that committee was Chief Judge Stephen
Chandler. Graham, Can Judges Silence a Judge?, N.Y. Times, Jan. 16, 1966,
§4, p. 8, col. 2.
2828 U.S.C. § 137. (1964).
29 Note, 31 ILL. L. REv. 631, 633 (1937) ; see also Shartel, supra note 12,
at 870-73.
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impeachment process the desired independence of the judiciary could
best be secured. Since 1789, however, the circumstances have been
radically altered-the number of federal judges has been greatly
increased, and the complexity of congressional work today would
seem to make the impeachment process an inappropriate tool to
realize the desired end. Concluding, therefore, that the judiciary
should be given power to remove its members, it is necessary to
provide a proper basis of authority for such action.
The establishment of an alternative method for the removal of
federal judges can best (and perhaps only) be achieved by enactment
of a constitutional amendment, since all of the available evidence
points to the conclusion that the Constitution limits removal to one
method-impeachment.30 In drafting such an amendment, careful
consideration should be given to the recent constitutional enactments
of both California and New York relating to the creation of a
special tribunal with jurisdiction limited to judicial removals.
In California, a commission composed of judges, lawyers and
laymen has been created to receive and investigate complaints against
judicial officers. 31 If the charges are substantiated, the judge's
retirement for disability or removal for misconduct is recommended
to the Supreme Court of California which acts as an appellate
body. In reviewing the action of the commission, the court is
empowered to declare such action final.
In New York, a court on the judiciary has been vested with
the power of removal or retirement of a judge. 32 This court, composed entirely of judges, may be convened by the chief judge of
the Court of Appeals on his own motion, and must be convened
by him upon the request of the governor, a presiding justice of the
appellate division, or by a majority of the executive committee of
the state bar association. Upon notice of the proceeding for removal
or retirement of a judge or justice pending before the court, the
state legislature is empowered to transfer the action to itself, whereupon the court action is stayed, and the formal impeachment
proceedings are commenced by the legislature. In this case, the
legislative determination is exclusive and final.
It might be desirable to incorporate the advantages of both
methods within the framework of a proposed amendment so that
the necessary procedural safeguards, in conjunction with expeditious
removal, can be assured. It seems that the commission established
30 Yankwich, Impeachment of Civil Officers Under the Federal Constitution, 26 GEo. L.J. 849, 865 (1938).
31 CA. CoNsT. art. 6, §§ lb, l0b. As a result of complaints being filed
and investigated by the commission, the resignation or retirement of a small
number of judges has been induced. Burke, Judicial Discipline and Removal,

The California Story, 48 J. Am. JuD. Soc'y 167, 170 (1965).
32 N.Y. CoNsT. art. 6, §§ 22 (a)-(e), 23, 24 (Supp. 1965).
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in California, rather than a specially convened court, would be
better able, in the first instance, to investigate complaints against
judges. If the charges stated in the complaint appear to have a
reasonable basis, then upon the request of the commission, a court
on the judiciary could be convened to try the merits of the case
and reach a determination. In addition, provision could be made
for removal of the cause to the legislature for the purpose of the
initiation of impeachment proceedings.
It is submitted that the promulgation of such a constitutional
amendment dealing with judicial removal is the preferred solution
to the many problems brought to light by the instant case.

CRIMINAL LAW - DEFENDANT NOT ALLOWED CREDIT FOR
TIME SERVED UNDER VOID CONVICTION IF SUBSEQUENTLY CONVICTED OF SAME OFFENSE. -Because
the trial court lacked juris-

diction, petitioner's felony conviction was held void, and he was
released on a writ of habeas corpus after serving one and a half
years of his original sentence. Thereafter, he was retried for the same
crime, and was validly convicted and sentenced once more to serve
from one to three years. On appeal, the question before the reviewing
court was whether the time served under his former sentence should
be applied to his present term. By stipulation, it was agreed that if
previous time served was ruled applicable to his present sentence,
the petitioner was entitled to immediate release. The Supreme
Court of New Mexico held that credit may not be given for a term
served under a void conviction, as distinguished from a prior invalid
sentence, if the petitioner is subsequently validly convicted of the
same offense. Morgan v. Cox, 75 N.M. 472, 406 P.2d 347 (1965).
An analysis of the background against which the decision in the
instant case was reached reveals little uniformity among the several
states in their respective approaches to the problem of the felon who
has served a portion of a prison term under a prior void conviction
or invalid sentence and is subsequently validly convicted or sentenced
for the same crime. However, a study of the varying decisions
and statutory solutions adopted by different jurisdictions serves to
awaken increased interest and sympathy for the plight of prisoners
who have served time in excess of the maximum penalty established
by the legislature for their crimes simply because they have "successfully" challenged their original convictions and obtained new
trials.
With respect to jurisdictions applying the common-law approach
to this problem, the differing positions may be divided into three

